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INTRODUCTION
1

Robo-advisers have become an increasingly prominent source of
investment advice in the financial services industry.2 These roboadvisers, synonymous with terms such as “digital advisers” and
“digital advice,” represent a relatively small market share in
comparison with more traditional investment advisers.3 However, the
recent proliferation of robo-advisers4 has caught the attention of
regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”).5 The continuing growth of this technology leads the
world of legal academia to question the regulatory regime currently in
place by scrutinizing current law and calling for newly renovated
1. Robo-advisers are “registered investment advisers that use computer algorithms
to provide investment advisory services online with often limited human interaction.”
Press Release, SEC, SEC Staff Issues Guidance Update and Investor Bulletin on RoboAdvisers (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-52.html [https://perma.cc/
4QXY-T99A]. Beyond a digital platform and proprietary algorithms, there is substantial
variation in business models, resulting in a less-than-concrete definition of “robo-adviser.”
BlackRock, a large financial services firm, points to four distinct differences in levels of
sophistication across robo-advisers: (1) customization, (2) tax management, (3) human
intervention/oversight, and (4) type of entity providing digital advice. BLACKROCK,
DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBO ADVISORS COME OF AGE 4–5 (2016),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investmentadvice-september-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZN6-SZ57].
2. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum (Nov.
14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.html
[https://perma.cc/PYR8-Z8DT] (“The last few years have seen rapid growth in the
availability and popularity of automated investment advisory programs.”).
3. BLACKROCK, supra note 1, at 1 (“While digital advisors represent a very small
segment relative to more traditional financial advice providers, their recent rapid growth
suggests a need for a focused analysis of the business and activities of these advisors.”).
4. One report predicted that robo-advisers will have $2.2 trillion in assets under
management (“AUM”) by 2020. TERESA EPPERSON ET AL., A.T. KEARNEY, HYPE VS.
REALITY: THE COMING WAVES OF “ROBO” ADOPTION
26
(2015),
http://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7132014/Hype+vs.+Reality_The+Coming+
Waves+of+Robo+Adoption.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF7M-MKHF].
5. See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, NO. 2017-02, GUIDANCE UPDATE: ROBOADVISERS 1 (2017) [hereinafter SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE], https://www.sec.gov/
investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU3S-N5CM]; FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 1 (2016),
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9M88-7QVC]; Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, SEC (May 8, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/autolistingtoolshtm.html [https://perma.cc/
GJ95-FCK5];
Investor
Bulletin:
Robo-Advisers,
SEC
(Feb.
23,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html [http://perma.cc/
8476-AKMQ]. State securities agencies have also opined on the topic. See MASS. SEC.
DIV., POLICY STATEMENT: ROBO-ADVISERS AND STATE INVESTMENT ADVISER
REGISTRATION 1 (2016), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/PolicyStatement–RoboAdvisers-and-State-Investment-Adviser-Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FP-D4L7].
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methodology. The conversation in legal academia surrounding roboadvisers currently pertains to the legal obligations that robo-advisers
owe their clients6: whether robo-advisers can or cannot fulfill their
duties as fiduciaries under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(“Advisers Act”).7 As it currently stands, pursuant to SEC guidance,
robo-advisers are regulated as investment advisers under the Advisers
Act, thus sparking debate over whether robots can adequately
perform the fiduciary duties owed to their clients.8
Notwithstanding the question of whether robots can be
fiduciaries, there is another discussion of equal importance worth
considering: the debate as to whether the legal standards governing
investment advice should be harmonized. In fact, now is an excellent
time to have that discussion. The SEC has renewed its interest in the
differing standards of conduct that govern investment advisers and
broker-dealers.9
The difference between being regulated as an investment adviser
or as a broker-dealer is important because the two are held to
different legal standards in connection with the investment advice
given. However, the actual differences in their functions are
negligible. The difference is that investment advisers are held to a
fiduciary standard, whereas broker-dealers are held to a lower
6. See generally Megan Ji, Note, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating RoboAdvisors Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543 (2017)
(arguing that robo-advisers are “structurally capable” of meeting duty of care standards
required under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 if regulated properly); John
Lightbourne, Note, Algorithms & Fiduciaries: Existing and Proposed Regulatory
Approaches to Artificially Intelligent Financial Planners, 67 DUKE L.J. 651 (2017) (arguing
that robo-advisers can meet a fiduciary standard as currently modeled).
7. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012)).
8. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1–2.
9. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Public Statement: Public Comments from Retail
Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment Advisers
and Broker-Dealers (June 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statementchairman-clayton-2017-05-31 [https://perma.cc/38CT-E8JT]. In fact, Chairman Clayton
specifically asked for public input on the matter:
Market developments and advances in technology continue to transform the ways
in which retail investors obtain advice (e.g., robo-advisers, fintech). How do retail
investors perceive the duties that apply when investment advice is provided in new
ways, or by new market entrants? Is this perception out of step with the actual
obligations of these entities and, if so, in what ways? How should these market
developments and advances in technology affect the Commission’s consideration
of potential future actions? What steps should the Commission take, if any, to
address potential confusion or lack of information in these emerging areas?
Id.
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standard of advice deemed suitable to the client in the specific
circumstances.10 Furthermore, investment advisers have continuing
obligations pertaining to being a fiduciary, while broker-dealers are
able to insulate themselves from liability by pointing to the suitability
of the singular trade at that given point in time.11
The logic for promoting what many have termed a “harmonized”
or “uniform” standard is straightforward: investment advisers and
broker-dealers generally perform the same functions and thus should
be held to the same standards under the law. On the other side of the
coin is the argument that a uniform standard should not be
implemented. A prominent line of reasoning against the need for a
uniform standard is that holding broker-dealers to a lesser standard
provides more affordable investment services for those who cannot
afford a registered investment adviser.12 This argument certainly has
teeth, as it takes into account the economic reality that the availability
of a lesser degree of personalized investment advice by brokerdealers may allow a larger number of market participants to receive
advice.13 However, because robo-advisers have filled the gap for costeffective advice—and the SEC has confirmed they are held to the
higher fiduciary standard14—there is no longer a persuasive need for
the lower standard given to broker-dealers. Regardless, the discussion
of whether to have a uniform standard has pervaded the industry for
well over a decade, resulting in two congressionally mandated
studies15 and calls for public comment by the SEC.16

10. See infra Part I.
11. See id.
12. See Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice, J. FIN. PLAN., July 2012, at 28, 29 (“These less
wealthy clients may be less able to receive much-needed financial advice incidental to the
sale of commission products if brokers incur increased liability under a fiduciary
standard.”).
13. This argument necessarily depends on the idea that investment advice
professionals, if held to higher standards, would likely not take on low-to-mid-wealth
clients because the time spent on the accounts would not be worth the income produced,
or the income produced is not worth the legal liability from a general standpoint.
14. SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 2 (“Robo-advisers, like all registered
investment advisers, are subject to the substantive and fiduciary obligations of the
Advisers Act.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2012) (excluding “any broker or
dealer” whose advising services are “incidental” to his or her business).
15. See generally ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., LRN-RAND CENTER FOR CORPORATE
ETHICS, LAW, AND GOVERNANCE, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/G67N-QQ7V] (reporting the results of
one congressionally mandated study of uniform standards); SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 913 STUDY],
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The wide variety of business models in which robo-advisers and
their human teammates interact with their clients further exacerbates
the need for discussion on the matter.17 This portion of the equation
has not garnered any attention up to this point; however, it should be
at the forefront. While the SEC has proclaimed robo-advisers as
investment advisers under the Advisers Act’s regime, the gray area
when factoring in different business models is striking. Hybrid models
of robo-advisers18 are increasingly becoming the norm.19 If the
differing legal standards between investment advisers and brokerdealers remain, the SEC will likely encounter the enormous obstacle
of defining certain business models calling for various degrees of
interaction between robo-adviser and human teammates as either
investment advisers or broker-dealers. This Comment argues that a
uniform fiduciary standard is warranted because the accelerated
proliferation of robo-advisers—specifically, the myriad of potential
hybrid business models involving these robo-advisers—will provide
even greater uncertainty to the current regulatory regime. This
uncertainty will not only frustrate market participants but also
generate even greater issues for the SEC down the road.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an
overview of the legal standards to which investment advisers and
broker-dealers are held when they give investment advice to clients.
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PF2-4CLY]
(reporting the results of another congressionally mandated study of uniform standards).
16. See Clayton, supra note 9. Even more recently, the SEC issued a proposed rule on
its interpretation regarding the standard of conduct for investment advisers. See Proposed
Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers;
Request for Comment on Enhancing Investment Adviser Regulation, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,203
(proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
17. See BLACKROCK, supra note 1, at 6 (listing the primary business models for
advisers working together with digital advisers or digital advising platforms). See generally
DELOITTE & AVALOQ, EMERGING MODELS OF DIGITAL WEALTH ADVISORY,
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/lu-emergingmodels-digital-wealth-advisory-04102017.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2UC-RB9R] (discussing
digitization trends and evolving business models).
18. Discussion of “hybrid models” or “hybrid robo-advisers” throughout this
Comment is meant to differentiate between what may be called a “pure” robo-adviser,
consisting of just the algorithm and web-based platform with little to no human
interaction. By contrast, the hybrid model refers to a commingling of the algorithm and
human interaction, resulting in a hybrid experience for the end consumer.
19. See Barbara A. Friedberg, Growth of Hybrid Robo-Advisors to Outpace Pure
Robos, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-advisor/100616/
growth-hybrid-roboadvisors-outpace-pure-robos.asp [http://perma.cc/L8ND-W3MR] (last
updated Feb. 23, 2017) (“A recent study projected that the growth of hybrid human and
robo-advisors will outpace stand-alone robo-advisors in terms of assets under management
in the next several years.”).
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Part II synthesizes years of debate regarding whether the same legal
standard should govern the two types of investment professionals.
Part III discusses the recent regulatory activity surrounding roboadvisers and the legal conversation regarding whether they can be
fiduciaries under the law. Finally, Part IV analyzes how robo-advisers
add to the conversation of a uniform standard and concludes that
regulators would be well advised to harmonize the two standards by
creating a uniform standard.
I. OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT OBLIGATIONS OWED BY INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS
The two primary types of professionals that provide investors
with investment advice and guidance are investment advisers and
broker-dealers.20 Many investors are unaware that both the substance
of the work performed and the standards of care owed to clients
differ between investment advisers and broker-dealers.21
Furthermore, the SEC itself has recognized that the boundary
separating the two groups has been blurred throughout the years.22
The discussion for harmonization—as opposed to the status quo—is
well storied and oft argued in academia and industry alike.23 The SEC
recently asked for public comments from interested parties pertaining
to the harmonization, or lack thereof, of the standards of conduct for
investment advisers and broker-dealers.24
20. See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 701 (2010) [hereinafter Laby, Fiduciary Obligations].
21. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 76 (2009)
(statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC) (“We are studying whether to
recommend legislation to break down the statutory barriers that require a different
regulatory regime for investment advisers and broker-dealers, even though the services
they provide often are virtually identical from the investor’s perspective.”); HUNG ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 112–13 (observing that many investors do not understand “key
distinctions” between the two investment professionals, including their duties, titles, and
services offered).
22. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 702; see also JAMES HAMILTON,
SEC REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERS IN THE BRAVE NEW
WORLD 7 (2008), http://business.cch.com/securitieslaw/news/03-26-08a.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M7TY-D3UT] (“Some investment advisers, for example, may offer services that employ
computerized trading programs and may take an active, discretionary management role
over customer accounts. From the retail investor’s prospective [sic], these activities may
not be obviously distinct from those in which brokers typically engage.”).
23. See, e.g., Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 703 n.10 (citing calls for
harmonization).
24. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton issued a public statement on June 1, 2017, asking for
public comments pertaining to the two different standards. Chairman Clayton credits the
“Fiduciary Rule” promulgated by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and the DOL’s
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This part first introduces the fiduciary standard to which
investment advisers are held, along with the standard’s duty of care
and duty of loyalty components. It then introduces the various
standards to which broker-dealers are held. It concludes by briefly
summarizing the differences.
A. Investment Adviser Fiduciary Duty
Investment advisers are regulated under the Advisers Act, which
imposes a fiduciary duty standard on all advisers registered with the
SEC.25 The Advisers Act defines an “investment adviser” as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of
advising others, either directly or through publications or
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities . . . .26
The definition goes on to specifically exclude “any broker or dealer
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct
of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special
compensation therefor.”27
The Advisers Act was one of six federal statutes enacted in the
1930s that were designed to address mischievous conduct in the
securities industry, which was broadly believed to have caused the
Great Depression.28 The Advisers Act itself was “the last of the New
Deal securities laws” and “was probably the least considered and the
least important.”29 The Advisers Act was passed as a companion to
Secretary Acosta for urging the SEC and DOL to “engage constructively as we each
pursue our ongoing analyses of the standards of conduct applicable to investment advisers
and broker-dealers when they provide investment advice to retail investors.” Clayton,
supra note 9.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012).
26. Id. In lay terms, “[i]nvestment advisers are financial service professionals or firms
in the business of providing discretionary advice to client investors on how to allocate
investment assets.” Ji, supra note 6, at 1546 n.14.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Thomas Lee
Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C.
BANKING INST. 47, 51 (2011).
28. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The
other five statutes were the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and the
Investment Company Act of 1940. Id.
29. Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment
Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 406
(2016).
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the Investment Company Act,30 the latter initially taking the lion’s
share of import.31
Despite the rather innocuous beginning of the Advisers Act,
courts and the SEC have since expanded the breadth of investment
advice law.32 Perhaps the single most important case was SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,33 in which the Supreme Court
read the investment adviser fiduciary duty into the Advisers Act.34
The Court observed:
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a
congressional recognition “of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
investment advisory relationship,” as well as a congressional
intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest
which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or
unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.35
Thus, the investment adviser fiduciary duty was born.36 Although
there is no explicit mention of a fiduciary duty within the Advisers
Act,37 the SEC has said, “There is no doubt . . . that an investment

30. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789. The Investment Company
Act regulates companies that invest and trade in securities, as well as companies that offer
their own proprietary investment products for sale to the public. Ji, supra note 6, at 1547.
31. Both statutes stemmed from a congressional mandate, through the Public Utility
Company Act of 1935, directing the SEC to conduct a study on investment companies and
trusts. Id. at 1546–47. This study encouraged the Senate to introduce both the Investment
Company Act and the Advisers Act. Id. The SEC study itself did not focus on investment
adviser functions, and, after grueling negotiations pertaining to the Investment Company
Act, the study’s chief counsel prodded Congress to expedite passage of basic legislation.
See id.
32. See id. at 1548. “Mechanisms used to develop Advisers Act law include, but are
not limited to, federal court cases, interpretive releases, the SEC’s bully pulpit, no-action
letters, and enforcement actions.” Id. (citations omitted). The wide-ranging direction of
where the law can be promulgated results in a lack of clarity where “[t]he law is scattered
and standards are unclear.” Id. at 1549.
33. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). The case dealt with a registered investment adviser engaging
in conduct called “scalping.” See id. at 181–83. Most importantly, the Court found that the
practice of scalping violated the antifraud provision, which is found in section 206 of the
Advisers Act. Id. at 195.
34. See id. at 194–95.
35. Id. at 191–92.
36. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979)
(“[T]he [Advisers] Act’s legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to
impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.”).
37. Furthermore, apart from references that investment advisers owe their clients
fiduciary obligations in general, the SEC has promulgated no regulations that
substantively define the standards of care owed by investment advisers to their clients. 17
C.F.R. §§ 275.0–2 to .222–2 (2018).
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adviser is subject to the federal fiduciary duty . . . .”38 Furthermore,
the SEC has stated:
Under the Advisers Act, an adviser is a fiduciary. This fiduciary
standard applies to the investment adviser’s entire relationship
with its clients and prospective clients, imposes upon
investment advisers the “affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith,
and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,’ as well as an
affirmative obligation to ‘employ reasonable care to avoid
misleading’” their clients and prospective clients.39
The SEC has also stated:
The duty is not specifically set forth in the [Advisers] Act,
established by SEC rules, or a result of a contract between the
adviser and the client (and thus it cannot be negotiated away).
Rather, fiduciary duties are imposed on an adviser by operation
of law because of the nature of the relationship between the
two parties.40
Ultimately, however, the SEC has taken the position that clients bear
the burden of evaluating an adviser’s competence.41 The fiduciary
duty further encapsulates two broader notions—the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty—both of which must be adhered to by an
investment adviser.42

38. Memorandum from the Inv’r as Purchaser Subcomm. to the Inv’r Advisory
Comm. 4 (Feb. 15, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/iacmemofiduciaryduty.
pdf [https://perma.cc/XL5G-AF3T]. For a high-level discussion of the absence of a clear
definition of “fiduciary,” see Hazen, supra note 27, at 59–60.
39. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 36 (quoting Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191–92); see also Memorandum from the Inv’r as Purchaser Subcomm.
to the Inv’r Advisory Comm., supra note 38, at 4.
40. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 23 (2013) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT],
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4PCE2B7].
41. Ji, supra note 6, at 1552; see also Investment Advisers: What You Need to Know
Before Choosing One, SEC (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/investorpubsinvadvisershtm.html [https://perma.cc/G826-L6SP] (“While some
investment advisers and financial planners have credentials . . . no state or federal law
requires these credentials. . . . Before you hire a financial professional, be sure to ask about
their background. If they have a credential, ask them what it means and what they had to
do to earn it. Also, find out what organization issued the credential, and then contact the
organization [to independently verify it].”).
42. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 106–07 (2011); see also SECTION
913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 22.
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1. Duty of Care
The duty of care, which stems from section 206 of the Advisers
Act, encompasses two specific obligations—suitability and best
execution.44 Some believe that neither are enforced to a rigorous
standard.45 The SEC explains the suitability requirement as follows:
43

As fiduciaries, investment advisers owe their clients a duty to
provide only suitable investment advice. This duty generally
requires an investment adviser to determine that the investment
advice it gives to a client is suitable for the client, taking into
consideration the client’s financial situation, investment
experience, and investment objectives.46
Interestingly, this “suitability” obligation relies on a rule proposed by
the SEC in 1994 that was never adopted.47 Although recognizing the
rule was never implemented, the SEC has stated that the suitability
obligation does indeed “reflect[] the current obligation of advisers
under the Act.”48 The inquiry is ultimately based on what is
“reasonable under the circumstances.”49 Enforcement actions based
upon suitability grounds are somewhat rare and are seemingly utilized
only for the most egregious of violations.50
The second duty of care recognized in the Advisers Act is the
duty of best execution in selecting a broker-dealer.51 Once again,
there is no express duty of best execution in the Advisers Act or SEC
regulations, but the SEC has expressly noted its applicability.52 “Put
simply, when an investment adviser selects a broker-dealer to execute

43. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).
44. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1552.
45. See id.
46. General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, SEC (Mar. 11,
2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm [https://perma.cc/
8BR8-NYXA]; see also Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers,
59 Fed. Reg. 13,464 (proposed Mar. 22, 1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2018))
(offering a new rule that would “expressly prohibit investment advisers from making
unsuitable recommendations to clients”).
47. See Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 59 Fed.
Reg. at 13,464; see also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 40, at 24.
48. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 40, at 24 n.134 (noting that enforcement actions
against advisers have been initiated in the past for those providing unsuitable investment
advice).
49. Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 59 Fed. Reg.
at 13,465.
50. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1553 n.68 (listing a handful of SEC enforcement actions
that have utilized the suitability requirement).
51. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 28–29.
52. See id.
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the transactions she recommends, she must seek to ensure that the
client’s total costs are ‘the most favorable under the circumstances.’”53
Factors to be considered by the investment adviser when choosing a
broker-dealer include execution capacity, commissions, financial
responsibility, responsiveness, and value of that firm’s research.54
Similar to suitability, the SEC does not aggressively pursue
enforcement actions based on an adviser’s failure to comply with the
best execution obligation.55
2. Duty of Loyalty
The SEC has also recognized that the fiduciary duty owed to
clients requires investment advisers to place the interests of their
clients ahead of their own, which necessitates disclosure or
elimination of material conflicts of interest.56 Compared to the duty of
care, the SEC “is far more rigorous in its governance of the
investment adviser duty of loyalty.”57 In Capital Gains, the Court
tacitly recognized the unique importance of the duty of loyalty within
the Advisers Act.58
Indeed, in enacting the Advisers Act, Congress was “deeply
concerned about conflicts of interest in the advisory relationship.”59
Thus, “under Section 206, advisers have an affirmative obligation of
utmost good faith and full and fair disclosure of all material facts to
their clients, as well as a duty to avoid misleading them.”60
The SEC strictly enforces the disclosure requirement by
disallowing any waiver for conflicted investment advisers in certain
circumstances.61 The SEC has promulgated specific rules pertaining to

53. Ji, supra note 6, at 1553.
54. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 28–29.
55. Ji, supra note 6, at 1553. For examples of enforcement actions by the SEC
regarding best execution issues, see id. at 1553 n.72.
56. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 22.
57. Ji, supra note 6, at 1554.
58. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963)
(stating that Congress enacted the Advisers Act with the intention of addressing conflicted
investment advisers that could render advice “which was not disinterested”); see also The
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 177, 294 (1964) (providing that the Court
interpreted the Advisers Act “to require full disclosure in any situation in which there is a
possibility of bias”).
59. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 729.
60. General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, supra note 46.
61. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1554–55 (“There is no waiver for conflicted investment
advisers who believe in good faith that, despite the conflict, they still put their clients’
interests first; for advisers who take adequate internal precautions to address conflicts; or
for advisers who never acted upon a conflict.” (footnotes omitted)).
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disclosures. For instance, upon registering with the SEC, investment
advisers must file a Form ADV.62
B.

Broker-Dealer Standard

Broker-dealers are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).63 A “broker” is defined as “any person
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the
account of others.”64 Likewise, a “dealer” is defined as “any person
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities . . . for such
person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”65 Although the
SEC has authority over broker-dealers and regulates them through
the Exchange Act, FINRA promulgates and enforces specific rules
regarding the obligations owed to investors.66
Broker-dealers are generally excluded from regulation under the
Advisers Act;67 thus, “they are not subject to a federal ‘fiduciary’
standard of care.”68 The exclusion of broker-dealers from the
Advisers Act was “a recognition that brokers and dealers commonly
give a certain amount of advice to their customers in the course of
their regular business, and that it would be inappropriate to bring
them within the scope of the Investment Advisers Act” solely because
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1 (2018); see also Ji, supra note 6, at 1555.
They must update the form annually and more frequently if significant changes
occur. Part 1 of the Form ADV is primarily for SEC use and is formatted as a
check-the-box, fill-in-the-blank form. It asks questions regarding an adviser’s
business, ownership, clients, employees, business practices, and disciplinary past.
Part 2 of the Form ADV is divided into a brochure (Part 2A) and brochure
supplement (Part 2B). The brochure has nineteen items. In it, advisers must
describe, in plain English, much of the information they disclosed in Part 1.
Finally, the brochure supplement provides information about the professionals
working with a client’s account. Investment advisers must deliver both the
brochure and brochure supplement to clients before or at the time investment
advisers and clients begin their contractual relationship. Afterward, advisers must
update the documents and provide clients with a summary of material changes
every year. Including untrue statements in or omitting material facts from any of
these documents breaches the Section 206 duty of good faith and violates Section
207 of the Advisers Act.
Id. at 1555–56.
63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
64. See id. § 78c(a)(4)(A).
65. See id. § 78c(a)(5)(A).
66. See Ryan K. Bakhtiari, Katrina Boice & Jeffrey S. Majors, The Time for a
Uniform Fiduciary Duty is Now, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 313, 317 (2013).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2012) (excluding any broker or dealer that satisfies
two conditions: (1) investment advice is solely incidental to the conduct of business as a
broker-dealer, and (2) the broker-dealer does not receive any special compensation).
68. Bakhtiari et al., supra note 66, at 317.
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it is part of their business.69 Likewise, investment advisers are
excluded from the Exchange Act because they do not engage in
“effecting” securities transactions.70 Thus, they need not register as
broker-dealers merely because they have discretionary authority to
place orders and execute transactions.71
Broker-dealers have other various duties owed to their clients,
such as a duty of fair dealing, a duty of best execution, suitability
requirements, and various disclosure requirements.72 The
combination of SEC and FINRA rules has been said to impose
“fiduciary-like” rules that are designed to protect customers of
broker-dealers.73
Most notably, investment advice given by broker-dealers—if
incidental and devoid of any special compensation thereof—is held to
a “suitability” standard of care under FINRA Rule 2111.74 The
broker-dealer suitability requirement, in contrast to the suitability
requirement of investment advisers, is expressly set forth via
regulations.75 FINRA Rule 2111 requires “reasonable diligence”
when creating a client’s investment profile, including all relevant
factors to obtain “sufficient information” to make an investment
recommendation that is suitable for that specific client.76 Any
recommendations are analyzed for suitability on a case-by-case
basis.77 Recommendations are not deemed suitable merely because a

69. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,996 (Sept. 27, 1946) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276).
70. Investment Advisers; Uniform Registration, Disclosure, and Reporting
Requirements; Staff Interpretation, 50 Fed. Reg. 49,835, 49,839 (Dec. 5, 1985) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276).
71. Id.
72. MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, NEWS BULLETIN: A FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR
BROKER-DEALERS? HOW DODD-FRANK MAY CHANGE THE WAY BROKER-DEALERS
CONDUCT BUSINESS 1 (2010), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/100719
DoddFrank. pdf [https://perma.cc/3NCM-BGV3].
73. Melanie L. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated? 17–18 (Sept. 12, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028232 [https://perma.cc/F9U2WNGN] [hereinafter Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?].
74. See Rule 2111: Suitability, FINRA (May 1, 2014), http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 [https://perma.cc/HT5X-GK3T].
75. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?, supra note 73, at 18.
76. Rule 2111.04: Customer’s Investment Profile, FINRA (May 1, 2014),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859
[https://perma.cc/HT5X-GK3T].
77. See Rule 2111.05: Components of Suitability Obligations, FINRA (May 1, 2014),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859
[https://perma.cc/HT5X-GK3T].
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client consents to or agrees with them.78 Importantly,
recommendations governed by the suitability rule do not give rise to
an “ongoing duty to monitor and make subsequent
recommendations.”79
Additionally,
broker-dealers
should
only
make
recommendations that are consistent with the customer’s best
interests.80 This so-called “best interests” standard is built into
FINRA’s suitability rule. In effect, the directive that a broker-dealer
only make recommendations that are in the client’s best interests
serves as a prohibition on a broker “placing his or her interests ahead
of the customer’s interests.”81
Unfortunately, this implies “that FINRA’s concept of the best
interest standard is simply another iteration of the duty of loyalty
requiring brokers to refrain from self-dealing and unauthorized
conflicts of interest.”82 Further, the best interests duty does not
necessarily require the broker-dealer to recommend the least
expensive investment, so long as the recommendation is suitable and
the broker-dealer is not placing his or her interests ahead of the
client’s.83 Cost is simply one of many factors that FINRA deems
important in the suitability evaluation.84
Within the best interests duty also lies a best execution duty
similar to that of an investment adviser.85 Broker-dealers are required
78. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25
SUITABILITY: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON FINRA’S NEW SUITABILITY RULE 19 n.15
(2012) [hereinafter FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25], https://www.finra.org/sites/
default/files/NoticeDocument/p126431.pdf [https://perma.cc/J63G-KP9F].
79. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 12-55 SUITABILITY:
GUIDANCE ON FINRA’S SUITABILITY RULE 3 (2012), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/NoticeDocument/p197435.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ9F-5QLP]. This is in direct contrast
to an investment adviser.
80. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25, supra note 78, at 3.
81. Id.
82. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?, supra note 73, at 26.
83. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25, supra note 78, at 4.
84. See id.
85. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 15-46, GUIDANCE
ON BEST EXECUTION OBLIGATIONS IN EQUITY, OPTIONS AND FIXED INCOME
MARKETS 2 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_
Regulatory_15-46.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4W9-VTSA]. The regulatory notice asserts,
[A] broker-dealer’s obligation to obtain best execution of a customer’s order in
any security is based, in part, on the common law agency duty of loyalty, which
obligates an agent to act exclusively in the principal’s best interest, and also has
been incorporated explicitly in FINRA rules. As such, any broker-dealer, when
acting as agent on behalf of a customer in a transaction, is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to obtain the most advantageous terms for the customer.
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to “use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the
subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant
price to the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing
market conditions.”86 Factors used to determine “reasonable
diligence” include the “character of the market for the security,” “the
size and type of transaction,” and “the number of markets checked.”87
Despite the protection to customers provided by FINRA, some
commentators believe that the duties of broker-dealers fall short of
the fiduciary duty that applies to investment advisers.88
C.

Summation of Differences

Simply put, broker-dealers are held to a standard of suitability,
while investment advisers are held to a higher fiduciary standard.
Although not immediately obvious, the standards are significantly
different in terms of legal obligation and liability. Associate Professor
Arthur Laby of Rutgers Law School notes,
The suitability rule requires that a broker-dealer have a
reasonable basis to believe a recommendation or investment
strategy is suitable for a customer based on information the
broker must obtain through reasonable diligence. A fiduciary
standard is far more exacting. A fiduciary standard is a “best
interest” standard. Under a fiduciary standard it is not sufficient
to determine whether advice is suitable, rather the adviser must
act in the client’s best interest. Fiduciaries are subject to a
distinctive duty of loyalty, which, absent disclosure, prohibits
conflicts of interest when the fiduciary’s personal interest
conflicts with the principal’s interest, and conflicts of duty when
the interests of two or more principals conflict with one
another.89

Id.
86. Rule 5310(a)(1): Best Execution and Interpositioning, FINRA (May 9, 2014),
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10455
[https://perma.cc/7DQ2-BNGB].
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, supra note 72, at 1 (“While such duties
and requirements provide some degree of investor protection, they fall short of the
‘fiduciary’ standards described by the SEC.”); see also Bakhtiari et al., supra note 66, at
317–18.
89. Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should
Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 725 (2012) [hereinafter Laby, Selling Advice and
Creating Expectations] (emphasis added).
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II. THE DEBATE SURROUNDING A UNIFORM STANDARD
Scholars and industry alike have oft written and debated on the
differences between the standards governing investment advisers and
broker-dealers. Many recommend a unification, or harmonization, of
those standards into a so-called uniform, or “unitary,” fiduciary
standard that all providers of investment advice must follow.90
This part first introduces a congressionally mandated study,
spurred by section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), on whether to
promulgate a uniform fiduciary standard. Next, it briefly mentions the
SEC’s recent request for comment on the matter. Finally, this part
analyzes the arguments presented on the topic.
A. Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the DoddFrank Act, directing the SEC to perform a study on the different
standards investment advisers and broker-dealers owe their
respective clients.91 Effectively, Congress punted on the issue and
“handed the baton to the SEC.”92 Section 913 not only required the
performance of a study but also gave the SEC explicit rulemaking
authority in connection with that study.93 Quite simply, Congress gave
the SEC the authority to rectify any concerns that it had at the end of
the study regarding the differences in the standards of care to which
investment advisers and broker-dealers are held concerning
securities-related investment advice. Therefore, under section 913,
90. See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 59 (2010)
(arguing for harmonization of the standard of conduct between broker-dealers and
investment advisers by basing the standards of care and competence on professionalism
rather than fiduciary standard); Steven D. Irwin, Scott A. Lane & Carolyn W. Mendelson,
Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for my Best Interests? The Road to Become a
Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 61 (2009) (“A consistent fiduciary duty standard would
likely help to increase investor trust.”); Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 701–
02 (describing differences between broker-dealer and investment adviser regulation and
application of fiduciary standard).
91. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41
U.S.C.). This massive legislation exceeds eight hundred pages and constitutes “the most
comprehensive financial regulation ever adopted by Congress” when considering the
breadth of subjects, activities, and financial institutions to which it extends its reach.
Hazen, supra note 27, at 47–48.
92. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 735.
93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 1827–28 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012)); see
also Hazen, supra note 27, at 48.
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the SEC has the power to require a uniform fiduciary standard for
both types of investment professionals.
Complying with the mandate, the SEC issued its findings from
the study in January 2011.94 The findings contained two principal
recommendations. First, the SEC recommended consideration of a
uniform fiduciary standard for both investment advisers and brokerdealers when providing investment advice to retail customers.95 The
second recommendation was that all investors should be given the
same protections regardless of which type of investment professional
provides them with advice.96 Despite these recommendations, the
SEC has yet to act definitively, issuing no new rules or regulations on
this topic.97
B.

The SEC’s Request for Notice and Comment on the Differing
Standards

The gravity of this debate, and the more important notion of
protection for retail investors when it comes to investment advice, is
not lost on the SEC as a whole. At the behest of the Secretary of
Labor,98 and in the wake of extreme uncertainty regarding the
Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) so-called Fiduciary Rule,99 the SEC
94. See generally SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15 (describing the SEC’s findings
and recommendations based on the study).
95. See id. at ii. Notably, this recommendation explicitly states that the standard
should be consistent with the current regime applied to investment advisers, which would
mean a fiduciary standard. See id.
96. See id. at 129.
97. The overall recommendations of the study were supported by only three of the
five SEC commissioners, which may help explain why no new rules or regulations have
been promulgated on this topic. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs,
SEC, Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm [https://perma.cc/48MSNC2N]. Two of the commissioners dissented from the study, proclaiming insufficiencies in
the analytical and empirical basis in the recommendations made. See id. (“The Study
should be viewed as a starting point for further research and consideration, rather than as
forming the primary basis for rulemaking. Before the Commission proposes rules in this
area, more rigorous analysis - rooted in economics and data - is needed to avoid
unintended consequences.”). The two dissenting commissioners argued that the study does
not “fulfill[] the statutory mandate of Section 913 . . . to evaluate the ‘effectiveness of
existing legal or regulatory standards of care.’” Id.
98. Alexander Acosta, Deregulators Must Follow the Law, So Regulators Will Too,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 2017, at A19. For more information on the current Secretary of
Labor, R. Alexander Acosta, see Secretary of Labor Alexander Acosta, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/osec [https://perma.cc/W36R-2VNF].
99. The Fiduciary Rule comprises both a final rule and various prohibited transaction
exemptions that were newly adopted or amended at the same time. Definition of the Term
“Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg.
20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, and 2550). On May 22,
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issued a statement asking for public comments. The SEC’s goal was to
“engage constructively” as both the DOL and SEC “pursue [their]
ongoing analyses of the standards of conduct applicable to investment
advisers and broker-dealers when they provide investment advice to
retail investors.”100 While noting that the SEC has been reviewing this
area for quite some time,101 Chairman Clayton expressed that the time
spent on this review “illustrate[s] the complexity of the issues as well
as the fast-changing nature of our markets, including the evolving
manner in which investment advice is delivered.”102 Chairman
Clayton specifically recognized robo-advisers and other forms of
fintech103 as areas to which those responding with comments should
lend significant focus.104 Comments have been passionate and wideranging.105
2017, the Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury issued formal nonenforcement policy statements regarding the Fiduciary Rule. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2017-02, TEMPORARY ENFORCEMENT POLICY ON
FIDUCIARY DUTY RULE (2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/employers-andadvisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ72-BFJF]; see
also I.R.S. Announcement 2017-04, 2017-16 C.B. 1106 (Apr. 17, 2017). The Department of
Labor also issued a guidance document to provide compliance assistance to affected
parties. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONFLICT OF INTEREST FAQS (TRANSITION PERIOD)
(2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/
faqs/coi-transition-period-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC4S-LMJQ].
For a detailed discussion on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule and its embattled existence, or
lack thereof, see Karmel, supra note 29, at 423–25.
Furthermore, a Presidential Memorandum issued by President Trump directed the
DOL “to examine the Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect
the ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice.”
Memorandum on the Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 95, at 1 (Feb.
3, 2017). This resulted in yet another delay for the embattled DOL rule.
As of June 21, 2018, the Fiduciary Rule was put to rest for the time being, as the Fifth
Circuit issued a mandate vacating the Fiduciary Rule in total. Chamber of Commerce v.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 2018). In striking down the Fiduciary Rule
for overstepping the DOL’s authority, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he Fiduciary
Rule . . . bears hallmarks of ‘unreasonableness’ under Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and
capricious exercises of administrative power.” Id.
100. Clayton, supra note 9.
101. See id. (referencing the Section 913 Study, the RAND Institute study published in
2008, and a solicitation of data and other information by the SEC in 2013).
102. Id.
103. Fintech is a portmanteau which combines the words “financial” and “technology”
to reference innovative and disruptive technology in the financial sector. See Fintech,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp [https://perma.cc/FMC74XZ2].
104. Clayton, supra note 9. Clayton explains:
Market developments and advances in technology continue to transform the ways
in which retail investors obtain advice (e.g., robo-advisers, fintech). How do retail
investors perceive the duties that apply when investment advice is provided in new
ways, or by new market entrants? Is this perception out of step with the actual
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Arguments For and Against a Uniform Standard

Efforts to unify the standard, and efforts to the contrary, have
been ongoing for well over a decade. Interested parties to the
conversation include academics, interest groups, policymakers, and
industry, all of which have presented several justifications for a
change.106
1. Investor Confusion
Perhaps the most common justification in support of a uniform
standard is that investors are simply confused as to the difference in
roles between investment advisers and broker-dealers.107 This
confusion was further highlighted in the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice report from 2008,108 which was commissioned by the SEC in
order to research the different protections afforded to retail investors
under the Advisers Act and the Exchange Act.109 Indeed, this report
became a rallying cry from academia to the Treasury Department for
obligations of these entities and, if so, in what ways? How should these market
developments and advances in technology affect the Commission’s consideration of
potential future actions? What steps should the Commission take, if any, to address
potential confusion or lack of information in these emerging areas?
Id. (emphasis added).
105. Examples of those who have submitted comments are: Senator Elizabeth Warren;
the Director of Policy Research from Morningstar, Inc.; the Chairman and CEO of The
Vanguard Group, Inc.; and the Managing Director and Associate General Counsel of the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. See Public Comments from Retail
Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment Advisors
and Broker-Dealers, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/comments/ia-bd-conduct-standards/
iabdconductstandards.htm [https://perma.cc/K477-B7BQ] (last modified July 24, 2018).
In addition, the comments include someone named Spencer Gould who simply wished to
say, “Hands off my 401(k) Wall St!” Spencer Gould, Comment to Public Comments from
Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment
Advisors and Broker-Dealers, SEC (July 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ia-bdconduct-standards/cll4-156542.htm [https://perma.cc/ULL6-4TBT].
106. See Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 736.
107. See Irwin et al., supra note 90, at 53 (explaining that recent surveys indicated what
they called “understandable confusion”); Knut Rostad, Strengthen Disclosures by Limiting
Their Role in the Delivery of Investment and Financial Advice, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
141, 144–46 (2011) (reviewing studies regarding investor confusion about the difference
between investment advisers and broker-dealers); Gary A. Varnavides, Note, The Flawed
State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary
Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 204 (2011) (“[B]rokerdealers and investment advisers offer virtually identical services to investors, resulting in
considerable confusion for both investors and regulators.”).
108. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 31.
109. For more information about the rule the SEC adopted with regard to the
Adviser’s Act, see generally Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment
Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
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a uniform standard.110 The SEC warned of the same in the Section 913
Study, showing that retail customers are plainly confused by the
differing roles.111
It is important to note that there is inherent risk in investing,
regardless of who is advising an investor.112 Indeed, all investments
have risks associated with them. However, that argument is certainly
not sufficient to combat the shortcomings of holding investment
professionals to differing standards.
2. Investor Expectations
Investors may expect that their brokers are held to the same
standard as investment advisers or any other person in the profession
of giving investment advice. This expectation may be addressed in the
fine print of the contract, stating that broker-dealers are not held to a
fiduciary standard.113 Ultimately, this places the burden upon the
investors to “parse through legal distinctions to determine whether
the advice they receive was provided in accordance with their
expectations.”114 The RAND Report introduced empirical evidence
to this end, highlighting a TD Ameritrade survey which found that
sixty percent of respondents believe broker-dealers owe a fiduciary
duty to their clients.115
3. Reasonable Expectations
Another possible justification is that of reasonable expectations.
A proponent of this justification, Professor Laby does not believe the
aforementioned arguments are compelling and do not, in themselves,
justify a uniform standard.116 However, he puts forth a compelling
argument that centers around broker-dealers holding themselves out
to be the same as investment advisers.117 As Laby explains, the
110. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 125–26 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP27-JKZS] (arguing that brokers
who provide investment advice to retail customers should be held to the same fiduciary
standard as investment advisers).
111. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 101.
112. See Risk Disclosures, INV. CTR., INC., https://www.investmentctr.com/client/
disclosures/risk-disclosures [https://perma.cc/WB25-F7AS].
113. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (“Unlike the case of investment advisers . . .
broker-dealers are not categorically bound—by statute, regulation, or precedent—to a per
se rule imposing fiduciary obligations toward clients.”).
114. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 101.
115. HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 31.
116. See Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 753.
117. See id. at 753–54.
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implications of heavy advertising and use of titles to connote an
advisory relationship lead to the creation of reasonable expectations
that the broker-dealer is the client’s fiduciary.118 This results in
common law consequences that generally justify broker-dealers being
held to a fiduciary standard alongside investment advisers.119 The
argument concludes that, overall, broker-dealers’ “use of
advertisements and titles, which induce[] customers to obtain advice
from brokerage firms[,] . . . creates a reasonable expectation that
brokers providing advice are fiduciaries and must act in customers’
best interest.”120
4. Functional Similarities Despite Inconsistent Standards
This argument centers around the fact that brokers have
functionally become investment advisers and, yet, are held to a
different standard. The most explicit mention of this argument came
in a 2009 Treasury Department White Paper, which stated that
“investment advisers and broker-dealers are regulated under different
statutory and regulatory frameworks, even though the services they
provide often are virtually identical from a retail investor’s
perspective.”121 The argument is that “[u]nder a functional approach
to regulation, two groups of people performing the same function
should be regulated by the same standard.”122 Critics point out that
disparate regulatory treatment does not, in itself, qualify as a
compelling argument for regulatory change.123
This functional approach argument encapsulates the issue
presented by robo-advisers. While it is settled that the pure roboadviser model is a fiduciary under the Advisers Act, it is the hybrid
model that is left with uncertainty. Consider the scenario of two
hybrid business models. Each hybrid model gives partial
responsibility to the algorithm and partial responsibility to a human
investment professional. Model 1 has an algorithm churn out
investment advice adequate for the specific client in question, then
has a human broker-dealer make the call to the client regarding the
new investment or strategy. Model 2 is the exact same but utilizes a
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id.
See id. at 773.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 71,
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/98J6K5CX].
122. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 742.
123. See id. at 742–43.
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human registered investment adviser to make the phone call. The
distinction between whether the human is an investment adviser or a
broker-dealer is important. If the exact same conversation takes place
with a client in both Model 1 and Model 2, the investment advice
from each conversation is held to a different legal standard.
Currently, the advice given by Model 1—utilizing a human brokerdealer—is held to the lower suitability standard. In contrast, the
advice given by Model 2—utilizing a human investment adviser—is
held to the higher fiduciary standard. In both scenarios—whether a
broker-dealer or investment adviser—a human makes a phone call
and little else. However, the investment advice, rooted only in the
algorithm’s genius, is held to a more stringent legal standard.
5. Ineffective Standards
Some commentators believe that the suitability standard
imposed on broker-dealers is simply too weak to protect retail
investors and that the standard needs strengthening.124 Most, if not all,
advocates of this approach believe that the fiduciary standard
imposed upon investment advisers would provide investors with a
higher standard of protection than the existing suitability standard.125
While arguable, most would agree that regulation of brokerdealers under the suitability standard is less demanding than the
fiduciary standard imposed upon investment advisers. It is a matter of
degree and circumstance. Ultimately, advocates of a fiduciary
standard argue the obvious: broker-dealers may recommend an
investment that is simply suitable and need not be in the client’s best
interest.126
Critics of this argument point out what the advocates may be
overlooking: broker-dealers may be “already subject to significant
fiduciary-like obligations when acting as more than mere order takers
for their customers.”127 The argument proceeds that existing brokerdealer law already accounts for those broker-dealers who are acting
in the same capacity as an investment adviser.128 However, whether
the SEC enforces the situation in that way is another ballgame
altogether. Ultimately, the fact that the standard of care may be lower
does not in itself prove that the investment advice rendered is of a
124. See, e.g., id. at 744.
125. See id. at 743–44.
126. Id. at 744.
127. Hazen, supra note 27, at 49; see also Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?,
supra note 73, at 17.
128. See Hazen, supra note 27, at 48–49.
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lower quality or not regulated to a sufficient extent. Another critique
of this argument is simple, yet eloquent: “a higher standard is not
necessarily a better standard.”129
6. Theoretical Economic Benefits
The sixth argument tracks the economic proposition that a
fiduciary standard will “benefit investors more than it will cost
them.”130 Evaluation of that claim necessitates a utilitarian costbenefit analysis of gigantic theoretical proportions.131 The Obama
administration used this theory.132
The main critique of the investor benefits argument is that the
claim is simply theoretical and unsubstantiated.133 Due to this
inherent limitation, it is presumed that a proper “justification will
have to be based largely on non-economic grounds.”134 Since this
Comment is not economic in nature, the theory behind the claim is
beyond its scope.
III. ROBO-ADVISERS AND THE CURRENT MAINSTREAM
NARRATIVE
This part introduces the overall atmosphere surrounding roboadvisers, including what they are, recent developments, and the
current regulatory scheme. This part first provides a background
regarding what exactly a robo-adviser is and briefly describes certain
attributes about robo-adviser business models. Next, this part
presents the latest regulatory scrutiny surrounding robo-advisers.
Finally, this part synthesizes the current legal discussions about roboadvisers and their ability to meet the fiduciary standard under the
Advisers Act.

129. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 746 (“If higher
were always better, then one ought to raise the standard of conduct applicable to brokers
and advisers to the highest possible level. This makes little sense.”).
130. Id. at 746.
131. See id. at 746–47.
132. This argument was used by the Obama administration to back the DOL’s nowdeceased Fiduciary Rule. “The Obama administration, which proposed the [fiduciary]
rule, claimed it would save Americans $17 billion a year from conflicted [investment]
advice.” Alessandra Malito, The Fiduciary Rule Is Officially Dead. What Its Fate Means to
You, MARKETWATCH (June 25, 2018, 1:55 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/is-thefiduciary-rule-dead-or-alive-what-its-fate-means-to-you-2018-03-16 [https://perma.cc/MZ9QU3U8].
133. See Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 748.
134. See id. at 749–50.
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A. Background on Robo-Advisers
Industry professionals are beginning to recognize that roboadvice technology has a good chance of “revolutionizing how
individuals receive investment advice.”135 These “sophisticated
machine learning algorithms [are utilized] to provide personalized
investment advice and monitoring 24-7.”136 Simply put, robo-advisers
are “online services that use algorithms to generate investment
recommendations for clients.”137
Due to the absence of human oversight and cost of human
advice, robo-advisers generally charge significantly lower fees than
other investment professionals.138 In addition, the robo-adviser
business model realizes efficiencies beyond just lower fees. Roboadvisers can actively and accurately perform common advisory
functions, such as rebalancing and tax-loss harvesting.139 As of the
beginning of 2017, the total assets under management (“AUM”) of
the six largest robo-advisers ranged from $1 billion (Future Advisor, a
subsidiary of BlackRock) to $60 billion (Vanguard Personal
Advisor).140 A report from 2015 speculates that robo-advice platforms
135. Ji, supra note 6, at 1544.
136. Lightbourne, supra note 6, at 652.
137. Ji, supra note 6, at 1543. FINRA uses the terminology “digital investment advice
tools” to refer to what are generally considered robo-advisers. See FIN. INDUS.
REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 2, 9 (2016)
[hereinafter FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE], http://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6N8-RW42].
Generally speaking, FINRA is concerned more with broker-dealers utilizing robo-advice
in conjunction with a broker. See id. at 2. The 2016 report does recognize, however, that
FINRA is concerned with what it calls “client-facing digital advice tools.” Id. at 9. The
SEC has recently described robo-advisers as “innovative technologies to provide
discretionary asset management services to their clients through online algorithmic-based
programs.” SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1. The Massachusetts Securities
Division defines fully automated robo-advisers as meeting the following criteria:
(1) do not meet with or conduct significant (or any) due diligence on a client, (2)
provide investment advice that is minimally personalized, (3) may fail to meet the
high standard of care that is imposed on the appropriateness of investment
advisers’ investment decision-making, and (4) specifically decline the obligation to
act in a client’s best interests.
MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 3.
138. See Does Not Compute, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31–Nov. 6, 2015, at 69, 69–70 (stating
that robo-advisers typically charge 0.25% or so of a client’s portfolio rather than the 1% to
3% typically charged by human advisers).
139. See, e.g., Rebalancing and Tax-Loss Harvesting in Schwab Intelligent Portfolios,
CHARLES SCHWAB, http://intelligent.schwab.com/public/intelligent/insights/whitepapers/
tax-loss-harvesting-rebalancing.html [https://perma.cc/KK9E-BKHG].
140. Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 717 n.11 (2018).
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will reach $489 billion in AUM by the year 2020.141 An even more
bullish speculation puts the number at approximately $2 trillion by
2020.142 While there may be uncertainty as to projection, it is
universally accepted that the market for robo-advice will continue to
rise steadily.
Robo-advisers employ a sizeable range of business models. For
example, “[s]ome robo-advisers provide investment advice directly to
the client with limited, if any, direct human interaction . . . .”143 Others
provide investment advice after parameters are set with human
advisory personnel.144 Furthermore, the methods of collecting client
information upon which to base the investment advice differs as
well.145 These differences in business models create a gray area that
the SEC has yet to clarify and will confuse clients even more with
respect to the differences between legal standards owed to them.
B.

Recent Regulatory Activity Impacting Robo-Advisers

Regulatory scrutiny has increased over the past few years, most
likely due to the rising sentiment in favor of greater protection of
consumers in the financial services arena. Despite a significant lack of
clarity surrounding the regulation of robo-advisers, one important
detail has been definitively settled: robo-advisers are subject to the
Advisers Act, as is any other registered investment adviser.146
Robo-advisers have come under regulatory scrutiny at times. The
debate surrounding the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule contained significant
mentions of robo-advisers.147 Worried that the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule
141. Damian Fantano, Large Retail Entrants to Boost Digital Advice: Cerulli, FIN.
TIMES: FIN. ADVISER (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.ftadviser.com/2015/11/12/ifa-industry/
large-retail-direct-entrants-to-boost-digital-advice-cerulli-jTEYXeJa6c0pt51VG974EM/
article.html [https://perma.cc/PHJ4-RLLH].
142. EPPERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 26.
143. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1.
144. See id.
145. See id. (describing how some robo-advisers utilize questionnaires of varying
lengths to obtain information, while others may use a human adviser to obtain information
or passively await client input).
146. See id. at 2; MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 4 (“[R]obo-advisers and traditional
advisers shoulder the same fiduciary duty.”). For regulatory duties owed under the
Advisers Act for registered investment advisers, see supra Section I.A.
147. See, e.g., Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Comment Letter on Proposed Conflict of
Interest Rule and Related Proposals, RIN-1210-AB32 (July 17, 2015), http://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/FINRACommentLetter_DOL_07-17-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LGT-EXF2].
The Fiduciary Rule would have required all persons providing investment advice to
qualified retirement accounts to adhere to a fiduciary standard. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–21
(2018). The hotly contested rule was adopted after a significant time period. See, e.g.,
Karmel, supra note 29, at 424–25.
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would tend to push its broker-dealers toward abandoning accounts
that do not meet a fairly low minimum investment, FINRA
commented that robo-advisers may not be able to act as a savior in
that respect because “robo-advice is a poor substitute for a financial
adviser who understands the customer’s needs and guides the
customer through market turbulence or life events.”148
Notwithstanding the prior statement, DOL Secretary Thomas Perez
has praised robo-advisers as low-cost tools for those who may be
ignored by business models that require high minimums.149 The
Fiduciary Rule was put on hold in 2017 when President Trump issued
a Presidential Memorandum directing the DOL “to examine the
Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect the
ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and
financial advice.”150 The Fiduciary Rule is now laid to rest for the time
being: the Fifth Circuit declared that the DOL overstepped its
congressional mandate.151
Following the decision by the Fifth Circuit to vacate the DOL’s
attempt at imposing stricter standards on broker-dealers, the spotlight
quickly turned to the states and whether they would attempt to do
what the DOL could not accomplish. New Jersey was at the forefront
of this push, becoming the first state to take action after the DOL’s
failed attempt.152 Governor Phil Murphy stated that he was pushing

148. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 147.
149. See Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL Secretary Perez Touts Wealthfront as Paragon of LowCost, Fiduciary Advice, INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARY FOCUS (June 19, 2015, 1:24 PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150619/FREE/150619892/dol-secretary-perez-toutswealthfront-as-paragon-of-low-cost [https://perma.cc/7U34-XZ23].
150. Memorandum on the Fiduciary Duty Rule, supra note 99, at 1. Governor Cuomo
of New York recently said that New York is considering implementing its own “best
interest” standard in the absence of the passage of the federal Fiduciary Rule. Press
Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Governor Cuomo Announces New Consumer
Prots. for Life Ins. Sales (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/
pr1712271.htm [https://perma.cc/P8L6-9N7R]. Cuomo notes that “[a]s Washington
continues to ignore and roll back efforts to protect Americans, New York will continue to
use its role as a strong regulator of the financial services and insurance industries to fight
for consumers and help ensure a level playing field.” Id.
151. See Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir.
2018) (“[The] DOL impermissibly bootstrapped what should have been safe harbor
criteria into ‘backdoor regulation.’” (quoting Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, 706 F.3d 499, 507–08 (D.C. Cir. 2013))).
152. See Greg Iacurci, New Jersey Fiduciary Rule Could Be First of Many Among States
Post-DOL, INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARYFOCUS (Sept. 26, 2018, 3:03 PM),
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180926/FREE/180929933/new-jersey-fiduciaryrule-could-be-first-of-many-among-states-post [https://perma.cc/S229-VB5S].

97 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2019)

2019]

ROBO-ADVISERS

699

for the new rule in order to protect the state’s investors.153 According
to Murphy, there is a need for state regulatory action because “most
consumers assume that financial professionals are required to give
unbiased advice.”154 Furthermore, “most investors don’t realize
broker-dealers often get undisclosed financial benefits for steering
clients toward particular investments.”155 The New Jersey rule is in
direct response to the Fifth Circuit’s quashing of the DOL’s Fiduciary
Rule.156 The robo-advisor industry, however, is expected to push back
against the attempt by New Jersey to institute a uniform standard of
care.157
The various publications released by the SEC, FINRA, and the
Massachusetts State Securities Division—which issue warnings and
guidance for both investors who currently do business with roboadvisers and those who are thinking of doing business with roboadvisers—are more directly impactful on the robo-advice industry.158
These publications indicate skepticism among the regulatory
community that robo-advisers may not be properly equipped to
comply with current law.
In 2015, the SEC and FINRA issued a joint Investor Alert
cautioning investors to focus on understanding a robo-adviser’s terms
and conditions, among other criteria, prior to investing.159

153. Murphy Unveils Fiduciary Duty for NJ’s Investment Brokers, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 17, 2018, 8:29 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/newjersey/articles/2018-09-17/murphy-unveils-fiduciary-duty-for-njs-investment-brokers
[https://perma.cc/XVZ9-U6DL (dark archive)]. In accordance with Murphy’s
announcement, the New Jersey Bureau of Securities is initiating work on the rule, which
will require all New Jersey investment professionals “to place their clients’ interests above
their own when recommending investments.” John Iekel, NJ to Follow Its Own Fiduciary
Rule, ASPPA (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.asppa.org/news/browse-topics/nj-follow-itsown-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/AB8E-LXQ8]. The state-level regulatory reforms will
“enhance the integrity of [New Jersey’s] financial services industry by holding every
investment professional to the highest standard under the law.” Id.
154. See Murphy Unveils Fiduciary Duty for NJ’s Investment Brokers, supra note 153.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See Greg Iacurci, New Jersey Brokers Expect Industry Will Push Back Against
Fiduciary Rule Proposal, INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARYFOCUS (Sept. 27, 2018, 5:13
PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180927/FREE/180929922/new-jersey-brokersexpect-industry-will-push-back-against-fiduciary [https://perma.cc/4FRZ-NMUS] [hereinafter
Iacurci, New Jersey Brokers].
158. See generally MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5 (providing guidance to investors
regarding robo-advisors).
159. See Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, supra note 5. The Investor Alert
cautions investors to consider five areas prior to moving forward with the relationship: (1)
terms and conditions, (2) limitations and key assumptions, (3) recognition that the roboadviser is making decisions solely based on the input that was given, (4) awareness that the
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Interestingly, the Investor Alert raised the concern that “you may
lose the value that human judgment and oversight, or more
personalized service, may add to the process.”160 In 2016, FINRA
issued a report on robo-advisers entitled “Report on Digital
Investment Advice.”161 The FINRA report ultimately seemed to
suggest that “absent intervention by a trained professional, the
investment advice given by a robo-adviser may be deficient.”162
Following FINRA’s report, the SEC issued concurrent releases in
February of 2017—one in the form of Investor Guidance and the
other in the form of an Investor Bulletin.163 The Investor Guidance
highlighted three specific areas that robo-advisers should pay special
attention to when analyzing compliance with the Advisers Act: (1)
adequate and effective disclosure, (2) collection of information to
deliver suitable advice, and (3) effective compliance systems.164 Most
importantly, the SEC stated in its Guidance Update that “[r]oboadvisers, like all registered investment advisers, are subject to the
substantive and fiduciary obligations of the Advisers Act.”165 Thus,
robo-advisers are to be held to the fiduciary duty owed by any other
investment adviser.
The Massachusetts Securities Division is the only state regulator
thus far to come out strongly in the negative as to whether roboadvisers can live up to a fiduciary standard.166 While federal regulators
have proceeded rather timidly and cautiously, Massachusetts stated,
“[I]t is the position of the Division that fully automated robo-advisers,
as currently structured, may be inherently unable to carry out the
fiduciary obligations of a state-registered investment adviser.”167

investment guidance given may not be appropriate, and (5) safeguarding of personal
information. Id.
160. Id.
161. See generally FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note
137 (discussing digital investment advice).
162. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?, supra note 73, at 6.
163. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1–2; Investor Bulletin: RoboAdvisers, SEC (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/
alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-robo-advisers [https://perma.cc/8ZHP-YGPF].
164. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 2.
165. Id. For regulatory duties owed by registered investment advisers under the
Advisers Act, see supra Section I.A.
166. See MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 8.
167. Id. at 1. Smaller investment advisers are governed by state regulatory agencies.
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 20.5 (7th
ed. 2017). If the adviser has less than $25 million in AUM, it must register according to the
state’s regulatory agency’s rules. Id. If it has between $25 million and $100 million in
AUM, the adviser must register under its state’s rules, unless greater than fifteen states
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Current Debate Surrounding Robo-Advisers’ Ability to Meet the
Fiduciary Standard

In the past few years, industry professionals, regulatory agencies,
and academics have “criticized the quality of robo-advice
recommendations” and have also “indicated skepticism that roboadvisers, as they currently exist, could ever meet the fiduciary
standards” that the Advisers Act requires of them.168 One
commentator believes that the arguments may be synthesized into
three closely related propositions: (1) limitations are inherent in using
questionnaires to gather data to base investment guidance upon, (2)
limitations of robo-advisers as binary creatures exist as a result of a
lack of a human element, and (3) robo-advisers lack experience in
anything but a bull market.169 The combined message of these three
arguments may be that humans are not ready to hand over the reins
completely.
The use of electronic questionnaires is a common practice with
robo-advisers.170 Critics argue that such questionnaires have a
tendency to miss vital information, which inevitably leads to an
insufficiency when considering the duties owed to clients.171 The SEC
has specifically flagged possible issues, such as the client’s lack of
opportunity to provide context to her answers and the robo-advisers’
lack of ability to follow up on a line of questioning or to clarify any
inconsistencies.172 The argument follows that these possible issues
could then lead to a robo-adviser’s failure to consider important
criteria such as “experience, time horizon, cash needs, and financial
would require it to register, in which case it is able to register with the SEC. Id. Advisers
with over $100 million in AUM must always register with the SEC. Id.
168. Ji, supra note 6, at 1545.
169. See id. at 1565–68. A bull market is “characterized by optimism, investor
confidence and expectations that strong results should continue.” Bull Market,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bullmarket.asp [https://perma.cc/
5V2B-4N95]. By contrast, investors and analysts colloquially use “bear market” to refer to
a downtrodden or downward-moving market. Bear Market, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bearmarket.asp [https://perma.cc/3AVV-73KY].
170. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6 (“We have observed that roboadvisers may provide investment advice based primarily, if not solely, on client responses
to online questionnaires.”).
171. Ji, supra note 6, at 1565; see also MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 5 (“[R]oboadvisers gather some information from prospective clients, but may not gather sufficient
information to enable them to discharge their fiduciary duties by providing personalized
and appropriate investment advice.”).
172. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6. The SEC goes on to suggest
factors that should be taken into account by robo-advisers in an effort to gather
information from their clients that is sufficient to meet their suitability obligation. See id.
at 6–7.
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goals.”173 The inability—or unwillingness, for that matter—to delve
into the margins of an investor’s current and future situations
provides fodder for arguments that robo-advisers are essentially an
investment brokerage service because they do not “tak[e] into
consideration an investor’s 360 [degree] financial picture and
goals.”174
The lack of “human perception” has also troubled critics.175
FINRA has observed that the human capability of truly developing “a
nuanced understanding of the client’s needs,” as opposed to “clientfacing digital advice tools rely[ing] on a discrete set of questions,”
may be absent when investing with a robo-adviser.176 Furthermore,
the problem may increase in magnitude when the tool does not allow
one to interact with an actual person, thus completely losing the value
of human judgment, human oversight, or more personalized service.177
Robo-advisers may miss crucial information in relation to the original
plan, resulting in unsound investment advice.178
The third argument posits that robo-advisers are ill-equipped to
handle market failures because they have never experienced anything
but a bull market.179 This argument centers on the physical capability
of a human adviser picking up the phone to calm down a panicked
investor and offer a resolution.180 In times of economic turmoil, it is
the human adviser who has the ability to talk investors through
173. Ji, supra note 6, at 1565.
174. Melanie Waddell, Can Robo-Advisors Really Be Fiduciaries?, THINKADVISOR
(Nov. 30, 2015, 11:31 AM), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/11/30/can-robo-advisorsreally-be-fiduciaries [https://perma.cc/B2WD-ACZA].
175. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1566–67.
176. FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 137, at 8–9.
177. See Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, supra note 5.
178. See Tara Siegel Bernard, The Pros and Cons of Using a Robot as an Investment
Adviser, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/your-money/
the-pros-and-cons-of-using-a-robot-as-an-investment-adviser.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
9UBF-GUJ4 (dark archive)] (discussing Professor Laby’s view that robo-advisers are not
“fiduciaries in the traditional sense because of their inability to address subtleties that may
arise in conversation”).
179. See Melanie L. Fein, Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look 5 (June 30, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658701
[https://perma.cc/WW9K-TW4L] [hereinafter Fein, Robo-Advisers] (stating that roboadvisers have been in existence “only during a bull market and are untested in how they
would perform in a downturn”).
180. See Robert Litan & Hal Singer, Opinion, Obama’s Big Idea for Small Savers:
‘Robo’ Financial Advice, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
obamas-big-idea-for-small-savers-robo-financial-advice-1437521976 [https://perma.cc/2GC8D2X2] (“An email or text message in the fall of 2008 would not have sufficed to keep
millions of panicked savers from selling, with devastating consequences for their nest
eggs.”).

97 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2019)

2019]

ROBO-ADVISERS

703

decisions to avoid the irrational investor phenomenon.181 Indeed,
cutting against the heart of this argument, Vanguard Personal
Advisor Services—Vanguard’s digital advice platform—markets itself
as the epitome of stability for investors.182 Critics are simply
concerned that there have been no use cases to analyze how roboadvisers will perform in a declining market.183
One commentator has pushed back against the popular concern
over whether a robo-adviser can meet its fiduciary duty of care and
concludes that “the investment adviser fiduciary duty of care is more
lenient than robo-advisor critics recognize and that a well-designed
robo-advisor meets the standard without issue.”184 Interestingly, it is
the conflicts of interest, part of an adviser’s duty of loyalty, where the
commentator believes that the bulk of concern should be placed.185
Ultimately, it is recommended that regulators do not endeavor into
duty of care issues but, rather, that they focus more intently on the
conflicts of interest present in robo-adviser business models.186
While there is certain to be more debate amongst interested
parties as to whether robo-advisers are truly able to meet the
fiduciary standard under the Advisers Act, the cautionary words
given by regulatory agencies function as mere bark rather than bite.
The regulators recognize that there may be inherent issues but are not
ready to act. Regardless of whether a robo-adviser is deemed to fall
short of its duty of care or duty of loyalty, the regulators have the
option to proclaim it as not meeting its obligations as an investment
adviser fiduciary to its clients.

181. The term “irrational investor” is used here loosely to refer to investors who
believe that they must sell assets when the price has gone down without any significant
change in the investment’s financials. For a more in-depth discussion, see Julia Hanna,
Behavioral Finance—Benefiting from Irrational Investors, WORKING KNOWLEDGE (June
6, 2007), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/behavioral-financebenefiting-from-irrational-investors
[https://perma.cc/HLB9-GUUT].
182. See Advice for Real Life, VANGUARD PERS. ADVISOR SERVS.,
https://investor.vanguard.com/advice/personal-advisor [https://perma.cc/7YLS-ZYTW] (“When
it comes to investing, your natural reactions can get in the way. It’s human nature to
overthink, overreach, and, at times, be overwhelmed. With Vanguard Personal Advisor
Services, an advisor serves as an emotional circuit breaker so you don’t abandon a wellthought-out plan.”).
183. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1567–68.
184. Id. at 1568.
185. See id. at 1579–83.
186. See id.
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IV. ROBO-ADVISERS MUST ENTER THE CONVERSATION ON A
UNIFORM STANDARD
Automated investment advice finds itself in the middle of the
shuffle of the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule,187 the SEC’s renewed interest in
public comment on a uniform standard, and the SEC’s stated
willingness to promulgate uniform standards on its own. Roboadvisers received ample spotlight from advocates of the DOL’s
Fiduciary Rule as an “exemplary, low-cost investment advice service[]
that act[s] in the best interests of clients.”188 Viewing robo-advisers in
this light effectively results in the DOL’s blessing as a backstop for
the potential negative consequences of the fiduciary duty being
applied to both investment advisers and broker-dealers alike.189 This
endorsement by the DOL has not gone unquestioned:
During the development of the Fiduciary Rule, DOL suggested
that “robo-advisers” will fill any gaps that result from
constraints on commissioned advice. Robo-advisers are a
relatively new and untested method of providing financial
advice and are not necessarily more cost-effective than inperson advice. No rigorous studies have examined whether a
robo-adviser is a good substitute for a human being, especially
in troubled markets such as the 2008 market crash.190
Further still, the SEC, in its most recent endeavor regarding the
differing standards of conduct, has explicitly asked for public

187. The importance of this conversation is even greater when considering the possible
impact the DOL Fiduciary Rule could have had on low-balance retirement accounts.
These accounts could have been too administratively expensive when it comes to
compliance for firms, so investors would flood in large quantities to the automated advice
market. One report has stated, “As firms move toward fee-based advisory, many lowbalance accounts will no longer be served, shifting many assets to formats such as roboadvisory and self-directed . . . .” A.T. KEARNEY, A.T. KEARNEY STUDY: THE $20 BILLION
IMPACT OF THE NEW FIDUCIARY RULE ON THE U.S. WEALTH MANAGEMENT
INDUSTRY 8
(2016),
https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7041991/DOL+
Perspective+-+August+2016.pdf/b2a2176b-c821-41d9-b12e-d3d2b0807d69 [https://perma.cc/
YUY9-WQPL].
188. Ji, supra note 6, at 1572.
189. See Schoeff, supra note 149. The argument is that an increase in the standard that
broker-dealers owe to their clients may make broker-dealers unwilling to assume the risk
of giving investment advice where the potential payoff is not worth their while, effecting
low-balance brokerage and retirement accounts. Id.
190. American Council of Life Insurers, Comment Letter on the SEC’s Request for
Public Comments from Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of
Conduct for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/ia-bd-conduct-standards/cll4-2640466-161282.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T5Y-ZGSS].
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comments to address the rise of robo-advisers and other disruptive
fintech.191 Specifically, Chairman Clayton asked the following:
Market developments and advances in technology continue to
transform the ways in which retail investors obtain advice (e.g.,
robo-advisers, fintech). How do retail investors perceive the
duties that apply when investment advice is provided in new
ways, or by new market entrants? Is this perception out of step
with the actual obligations of these entities and, if so, in what
ways? How should these market developments and advances in
technology affect the Commission’s consideration of potential
future actions? What steps should the Commission take, if any,
to address potential confusion or lack of information in these
emerging areas?192
Conspicuously absent from this discussion is the world of legal
academia. Due to the rise of robo-advisers and the increasing
prevalence of regulatory scrutiny and acceptance of robo-advisers, it
is necessary to revisit the ever-salient discussion regarding a uniform
standard through a lens that captures robo-advisers. The
acknowledgement that a plain definition of robo-advisers is missing
leads to the ultimate conclusion that rules should be either adapted or
promulgated de novo in order to specifically cater to the unique
characteristics of how robo-advisers are used in practice.
The following arguments highlight the need for a uniform
standard and the inadequacies of the current regulatory regime in the
context of robo-advisers.
A. Investor Confusion
As explained briefly above, the argument that investor confusion
warrants the imposition of a uniform standard has teeth.193 Adding yet
another entity about which investors could be confused might tip the
scales toward justifying a uniform standard.
Currently, it is clear that investor confusion surrounding the
duties that investment advisers and broker-dealers owe them is a
critical issue. Both the RAND Report and Section 913 Study
recognize this point clearly.194 Now, robo-advisers hold themselves

191. See Clayton, supra note 9.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. See supra Section II.C.1.
194. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 20–21; SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at
101; supra text accompanying note 108.
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out to be an entity that may give investment advice, which further
blurs the lines of exactly what duties are owed to their clients.
In fact, robo-advisers often aim to minimize the fiduciary duties
owed to their clients through the use of customer agreements with
clauses that perform this function.195 One robo-adviser expressly
disclaims that it has any relationship with the client, except as an
independent contractor:
[Robo-advisor] is and will hereafter act as an independent
contractor and not as an employee of Client, and nothing in this
Agreement may be interpreted or construed to create any
employment, partnership, joint venture or other relationship
between [Robo-advisor] and Client.196
Other customer agreements seek to limit the fiduciary duty owed or
seek to disown it altogether.197 This inevitably leads down the path of
investor confusion, broadening the impact of the disparate standards
altogether.
B.

Inconsistent Standards

Examining the different business models that robo-advisers may
employ adds to the inconsistent standards argument. The SEC has
stated that robo-advisers are held to a fiduciary standard when giving
investment advice to clients, but what about robo-advisers operating
in the capacity of a broker-dealer?
This key question has been overlooked thus far. It is now settled
by the SEC that robo-advisers are generally investment advisers
regulated under the Advisers Act, but there has been no mention
anywhere of whether automated advice algorithms utilized by brokerdealers are held to the same standard. Given the current law, it
appears that robo-advisers that operate as broker-dealers—or as a
supplement to broker-dealers—would, in fact, be governed under a
different standard than their investment adviser brethren.
The scenario is simple. Imagine that the same exact algorithm,
which operates independently of all human interaction, could be used
by a broker-dealer in conjunction with a human for the clients to call.
The algorithm performs the investment analysis while the human
performs the interaction, effectively functioning as a salesman. The
idea that the same algorithm used in two different capacities—one as

195. See Fein, Robo-Advisers, supra note 179, at 24.
196. Id. (quoting a provision from a robo-adviser customer agreement).
197. See id. at 24–25.
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a standalone registered investment adviser, and the other as a
supplement to a broker-dealer—could be held to different legal
standards is indicative that a uniform standard is warranted. While
the proposition is theoretical, it is ultimately probable.
The variance in human interaction would certainly be key when
considering whether that robo-adviser is operating in the capacity of
an investment adviser or a broker-dealer. This is the exact analysis
that should spur the SEC to finally put the issue to bed and regulate
investment advisers and broker-dealers under the same standard of
conduct. The argument that human investment professionals who
functionally give the same advice should be held to the same standard
is well documented.198 The natural corollary to the argument is that
bits of code that are exactly the same and produce the same output,
investment advice, should be held to the same standard.
C.

Reasonable Expectations

The advent of robo-advisers bolsters Professor Laby’s argument
that it is actually the reasonable expectations broker-dealers confer
upon their clients that ultimately create the fiduciary relationship.199
As described above, a robo-adviser that acts as a broker-dealer would
arguably create a reasonable expectation among clients that the
digital investment advice is investment guidance that is in the client’s
best interest. It would likely be foreign to many investors to hear that
an algorithm has been coded to actually work against their clients in
promoting more expensive or less strategic investing activity so that
the ultimate owner or user of the algorithm may make more money.
D. Proposal for Uniform Standard
The disparity between the standard of conduct owed by a
registered investment adviser and that owed by a broker-dealer has
reared its head prominently over the past two decades. Robo-advisers
must now be accounted for in the discussion. This Comment proposes
three potential solutions, all of which have varying degrees of
difficulty with implementation, administration, and effectiveness.
First, states could begin to follow New Jersey’s lead and
promulgate rules applying a fiduciary standard across the board
within their regulatory arms that oversee securities activity.200
However, the cost to market participants stemming from each state’s
198. See, e.g., Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 742.
199. See supra Section II.C.3.
200. See Iacurci, New Jersey Brokers, supra note 157.
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variance in its standard of conduct could be immense. Market
participants generally have to answer to three regulatory bodies
already—the SEC, FINRA, and state-level regulatory agencies. There
is a cost at each level.201 This cost further supports the salient
argument that low-cost investment advice could be impossible to
come by if broker-dealers are held to a fiduciary standard. In spite of
the high cost, state-level regulation may be necessary if states strongly
believe in protecting their citizens in this way. The SEC has had the
opportunity to apply a fiduciary standard across the board, most
recently in 2017, but has dropped the ball. Regulation by state
agencies might be the unfortunate product of the SEC’s unwillingness
to step up and handle the matter itself.
Second, the SEC could promulgate a blanket rule. A broad rule,
applying to all investment professionals and creating a uniform
standard, is the easiest path to harmony within the industry. It would
preclude states from having to do so, thus protecting firms from
having to increase costs of compliance across the board. However,
this option looks increasingly unlikely. The defeat of the DOL’s
Fiduciary Rule, the unwillingness of the SEC to move forward with a
uniform standard, and the general stance of the Trump administration
on matters of financial industry regulation indicate that this solution
is not likely, at least in the near future.
Third, the SEC sticks with the status quo—differing standards
between registered investment advisers and broker-dealers—but
accounts for the different business models employed by roboadvisers. The factors of investor confusion, inconsistent standards,
and reasonable expectations all point toward a uniform standard. If,
however, a uniform standard is not possible, the SEC could, at the
very least, account for the proliferation of robo-advisers and the
plethora of differences in their business models. Although the SEC
has said that robo-advisers are investment advisers, it misses the
difference between algorithms used as standalone investment
professionals and those used by broker-dealers in the same capacity,
albeit with a twinge of human interaction. The allowance of brokerdealers to use, in theory, the same algorithm to churn out investment
advice that is held to a lower legal standard is against the policy
implicitly espoused by the SEC. If accounting solely for the plethora
of business models, the SEC could use a sliding scale methodology
that accounts for the level of human interaction and decisionmaking
201. See id. (“Having to answer to three masters and duplicate efforts in improving
compliance becomes very challenging.”).
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against the interaction and decisionmaking of the algorithm. The SEC
would then need to account for different levels of human interaction
and decide what standard would be applied to each level. Suffice it to
say, this would be an arduous task for the SEC.
CONCLUSION
Robo-advisers are still developing in many ways. The law, in
turn, should develop with them. As robo-advisers become more and
more ubiquitous in society, it becomes increasingly important that
regulators follow along. This Comment argues that the conversation
surrounding whether a uniform standard should be implemented
across the two types of investment professionals should take heed of
robo-advisers. The discussion should consider the impact that the
growing automated advice market will have within those same
parameters. In regulating robo-advice, the SEC should take into
account not only the possibility of humans performing the same
functions and being regulated to different degrees but also the
possibility of algorithms performing those same functions and being
regulated to different degrees.
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